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ABSTRACT

OBOECT PERMAMNCE MTO KNOWLEDGE
OF NUMBER IN 5.5- AND 10MONTH -OLD INFANTS
FEBRUARY 1996

JEANNE L. SHINSKEY, B.A.

,

PROVIDENCE COLLEGE

M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Richard

S.

Bogartz

The study attempts to replicate
and extend the findings
of Xu and Carey's (in press) Experiment
1, which concluded
that 10-month-old infants use spatiotemporal
information to
infer the number of objects involved in an
occlusion event.

Two groups of eight infants each (four 5.5
and four 10 months
old) saw Xu and Carey's events involving
either one

(continuous-screen condition) or two (discontinuous-screen
condition) inferred objects.

Looking times to one and two

objects on subsequent test trials were recorded.

The

remaining two groups of infants saw events that were

perceptually similar to Xu and Carey's (continuous -periphery
and discontinuous -periphery conditions), with the exception
that the outcome of either one or two objects on the test
trials was impossible.

The cognitive processing hypothesis

predicts replication of Xu and Carey's results for the first
two groups of infants: infants should look longer at one

object following familiarization to the event with two
inferred objects, and longer at two objects following

familiarization to the event with one inferred object.
iv

The

cognitive hypothesis further
predicts that infants in
the
second two groups should
look equally long at
the unlikely
outcomes of either one or
two objects. However,
the
perceptual processing hypothesis
predicts

that infants should

Show the same pattern of
looking at one and two
objects in
all four groups: infants
should

look longer at two objects
in

the continuous-screen and
continuous-periphery groups, and
longer at one object in the
discontinuous-screen and

discontinuous-periphery groups,

xu and Carey's results were

not replicated: infants did not
look longer at the unlikely
outcomes following familiarization
events. Thus the
cognitive hypothesis is not supported
by this study. The
perceptual processing hypothesis fared
somewhat better in
that more of its predictions were
confirmed, although not all
were,
in addition, lack of replication of
the two original
conditions has made interpretation of the
results somewhat

difficult.

Further studies, using a different design, may

better differentiate between the two hypotheses,
but for now,
we do not believe the available evidence strongly
supports

cognitive processing of occluded objects in young infants.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Object Perman ence According to P^aq <^^-

Because this study investigates object
permanence in
infants, and because Piaget was one of the first
researchers
to empirically investigate object permanence in
infancy, a

brief summary of the Piagetian view of object permanence
is
necessary.

According to Piaget (1952, 1954), attainment of

the object concept is one of the most important achievements
of the sensorimotor period of development.

An infant who has

the object concept knows that objects continue to exist even

when they are not in view.

The object concept is important

because it is evidence that infants can mentally represent
events, and mental representations subserve most, if not all,

aspects of cognitive development.
In the Piagetian model (1952,

1954), knowledge of the

permanence of objects is acquired gradually.

The young

infant has no conception that objects exist separately and

independently from the infant's actions upon them.

Objects

are the extensions of the infant's specific actions, and the

infant engages in action to produce the object,

when the

object disappears, the infant briefly continues to perform
the same action in expectation of reproducing the object.

If

this behavior fails to produce
the desired outcome, the
infant ceases to repeat it, and
does not try to engage in
alternative behaviors. For the infant,
it is as if the object
is created and destroyed with
each appearance and occlusion.
From 4 to 8 months of age, the
infant will search for objects
that are partially occluded or that
have dropped out of
sight. It is not until about 8
months of age that the infant
will engage in new behaviors, search
behaviors, to try to
recover an object. According to Piaget,
the infant begins to
conceive of the object as existing apart
from the infant's
own specific actions between 8 and 12 months
of age.
The
object has a separate and independent existence
that, when
hidden, can be uncovered by many different behaviors.
Infants' acquisition of the object concept also extends

beyond the search for completely hidden objects at
months of age.

8

to 12

Between 12 and 18 months of age, infants

acquire the ability to successfully perform visible

displacement tasks, in which the object is moved, in view of
the infant, from one location to another.

Between 18 and 24

months of age, infants can perform invisible displacement
tasks, in which the object is moved out of sight of the

infant from one location to another.

2

Evidence for

Oh^^.r.i-

Permanfinnp

Piagef s conclusions were based on
tasks
infants manually searched for hidden
objects,

in which

other

researchers have suggested that younger
infants may fail to
search for hidden objects because they
have difficulty
performing coordinated actions, not because
they lack

knowledge of object permanence (e.g.,
Baillargeon, Spelke, &
Wasserman, 1985). Manual search tasks are
not well-suited
for exploring object permanence knowledge
in younger infants.

More recent methodologies have been used to
investigate
object permanence knowledge in young infants.

For example,

Baillargeon, Spelke, and their colleagues have undertaken
several studies using a visual habituation-dishabituation

paradigm to determine whether knowledge of object permanence
exists in younger infants (e.g., Baillargeon, Spelke
Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon

&

&

DeVos, 1991; Baillargeon

Graber, 1987; Baillargeon, 1987b).

6k

In these studies, infants

are visually habituated to an event, using a standard

looking-time criterion.

Dishabituation to a test event

occurs when infants perceive the event as novel, or according
to some researchers, impossible.
The following studies are discussed here because they
all conclude that object permanence knowledge is present in

infants younger than
concluded.

8

to 12 months, contrary to what Piaget

These studies provide an important foundation

upon which the present experiment is based.

Collectively,

they conclude that young
infants engage in cognitive
processing of occluded objects.
Not only are we unconvinced
that these conclusions are true,
we also have found that many
subsequent studies, particularly
those investigating
infants'

knowledge of number, use methodologies
based on the
assumption of object permanence
knowledge in young infants.
It is therefore important to
detail how
these studies are

carried out, as well as to point out
how pervasive these
conclusions are in the recent literature
on infants'

processing of occluded objects.
Many of these studies were carried out by
Spelke,
Baillargeon and their colleagues. For example,
Baillargeon
and Graber (1987) presented 5.5-month-old infants
with
possible and impossible test events following habituation
to
a toy rabbit moving across a stage and behind a screen,

in

the impossible event, a tall rabbit traveled behind a screen

with a window in it and did not show up in the window,

in

the possible event, a short rabbit traveled behind the screen
and did not appear in the window, as it was not tall enough

to do so.

Infants looked longer at the impossible than at

the possible event.

Baillargeon and Graber concluded that

the infants believed that the hidden rabbit continued to
exist, and maintained its height and trajectory while hidden.

The infants expected the tall rabbit to show up in the
window, and were surprised when it did not.

Baillargeon and

DeVos (1991) found similar results in a study with 3.5-month-

old infants, and concluded that young infants know that

Objects cannot exist at two
points in time without existing
in between, cannot appear in two
places without traveling a
continuous path in between, and cannot
move through the space
occupied by other objects. However,
Bogartz,
Shinskey, and

speaker (1995) found different results
using the same stimuli
and similar possible and impossible
events as Baillargeon and
Graber, but in a mixed-model design,
infants were
familiarized on one of the three types of
events (original

familiarization, impossible event, and possible
event), and
then tested with all three events. A multiple
regression

analysis revealed that impossibility and possibility
were not
factors affecting looking time,

infants looked longer at

test trial events because they had features that were

different from the familiarization event, regardless of the

possibility factor.
In a now classic study of object permanence in young

infants, Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985) habituated

5-month-old infants to a rotating screen moving in a 180degree arc.

After infants reached habituation, a box was

placed behind the screen.

Infants were then presented with

either a possible event, in which the screen stopped moving

when it reached the hidden box, or an impossible event, in

which the screen continued to rotate through 180 degrees, as
if the box had disappeared.

Infants looked longer at the

impossible event than at the possible event.

Baillargeon et

al. concluded that the infants knew the box continued to

exist behind the screen, expected the screen to stop moving

When it reached the hidden box,
and were surprised when this
expectation was violated,

m

variations of this study,

Baillargeon found similar results
with 7-month-old infants
(1987a) and with 3.5- to 4
.5-month-old
infants (1987b).

However, an alternative view
predicts that a mixed-model
design using the same stimuli and
events will show that
looking time is dependent not on the
possibility or
impossibility of the events, but on the
featural differences
between habituation and test events
(Bogartz et al., 1995).

Many more studies of this type have been
carried out in
the last decade (see, for example, Spelke,
Breinlinger,

Macomber

& Jacobson,

1992).

These studies almost unanimously

conclude that young infants represent and reason
about

occluded objects in much the same was as adults.

As will be

seen in the following section, many recent studies of
infants' knowledge of number also assume cognitive processing
of occluded objects in infancy.

Object Permanence and Knowledge of Number

The assumption that young infants have acquired the

object concept is a crucial one for the paradigms used by

Wynn (1992a), Uller (1993) and Spelke and Kestenbaum
cited in Xu

&

(as

Carey, in press) in their investigations of

infants' knowledge of number.

Wynn (1992a) used a looking-

time procedure with occluded objects in her study of addition
6

and subtraction in
5-rnonth-old infants.
Wynn's procedure was
as follows,
infants were shown an empty
stage. An object
was introduced onto the
stage, and a screen was
raised to
occlude the object, a second
object was placed on the
stage
behind the raised screen,
infants saw the object briefly
before it was occluded,
the impossible test event,
the
screen was removed and one object

m

m

was revealed,

the

possible test event, two objects
were revealed,
infants
looked longer at the impossible than
at the possible event.
Corresponding results were found with
infants in the

subtraction group.

Two objects on a stage were occluded
by a

screen.

One object was removed from behind
the screen, in
view of the infant. The screen was lowered
to reveal two
objects in the impossible event and one
object in the

possible event,
event.

infants looked longer at the impossible

Wynn concluded that infants have true numerical

concepts, and further suggested that these abilities
are

innate

Uller (1993) used 7- to 8-month-old infants to replicate
Wynn's (1992a) results in the addition event.

She also added

another condition that was a variation on Wynn's experiment.

Wynn showed infants the first object on the stage before
raising the screen and adding the second object,

uller

first raised the screen on the empty stage, then placed the
first object behind it, followed by the second object.
However, Uller 's 7- to 8-month-old infants did not look

differentially to one versus two objects.

When Uller used 9-

to 10-month-old infants in the screen-first
condition, she
found that the infants looked longer at
one than two objects.
This finding suggests that knowledge of
object permanence and

number are still undergoing significant development
between 7
and 10 months of age. Uller and her colleagues
are presently
investigating whether using two screens instead of one
will

provide infants with spatiotemporal information that may aid

them in this task

Uller and

(C.

communication, October

1,

S. Carey,

personal

1994).

Spelke and Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu

&

Carey, in press)

conducted an experiment using occluded objects to determine

whether 4- to 5-month-old infants could use spatiotemporal
information to infer the number of objects involved in an
event.
1

Infants were shown two screens on a stage (see Figure

on the next page for a similar design)

.

Infants were

habituated to an event in which one object emerged from

behind the left screen, traveled to the left, and then
returned to its position behind the left screen, followed by
an object that emerged from behind the right screen, traveled
to the right, and then returned to its position behind the

right screen again.

No object appeared in the space between

the two screens. Following habituation, infants were

presented with what the authors refer to as an expected or

unexpected outcome.

In the expected outcome test trial, the

screens were removed to reveal two objects.

In the

unexpected outcome test trial, only one object was revealed.
Adults express surprise at the unexpected outcome, and Spelke
8

1.

Object 1
emerges

2.

Object 1
returns

3.

Object 2
emerges

4.

Object 2
returns

5

.

Likely
outcome
or

unlikely
outcome

Figure

1.

Schematic representation

screen condition.

9

of

the discontinuous-

and Kestenbaum found that
infants looked longer at
the
unexpected outcome than at
the expected outcome.
Spelke and
Kestenbaum concluded that the
infants analyzed the possible
paths between the objects and,
failing to see any object
travel between the two locations,
inferred that there must be
two Objects. According to the
authors, the presence of only
one object in the test trial
violated the infants
expectations and was manifested by
•

longer looking.

in addition to the discontinuous
condition described
above, which will be called the
discontinuous-screen

condition from here on, Spelke and
Kestenbaum' s experiment
(as cited in Xu & Carey, in press)
also
included a

continuous-screen condition, in which one object
traveled
back and forth across the stage, appearing in
the
space

between the two screens (see Figure
similar design).

2

on the next page for a

Infants in this condition were given the

same test trials as in the discontinuous-screen condition,

displaying either one or two objects.

Infants did not look

significantly longer at one outcome than the other.

While it

is possible that more than one object could be involved in

the continuous-screen condition, most adults interpret the

event as involving only one object.
unexpected.

Two objects are

If infants have the same object-concept

knowledge as adults, they should look longer at two objects
than one.

10

1.

Object
emerges

2.

Object
crosses
stage 4
times

3.

Object
returns

4.

Likely
outcome
or

unlikely
outcome

Figure

2.

Schematic representation of the continuous-

screen condition.
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xu and Carey (in press)
conducted an experiment similar
to that Of spelke and
Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu &
Carey, in
press), with some modifications.
Participants were 10-monthOld infants, with whom Xu
and Carey did not find it
necessary
to use a full habituation
paradigm, xu and Carey reasoned
that if infants can use
spatiotemporal information in an
adult-like manner, they should be
able to infer the number of
objects involved in the event
without full habituation. Xu
and Carey fixed the number of
familiarization trials at four.
They also did not find it necessary
to use objects that were

continuously in motion, although Spelke
and Kestenbaum did.
Ten-month-old infants were able to sustain
attention even

when the objects were stationary part of
the time.
Xu and Carey found that 10-month-old infants
looked

longer at one object in the discontinuous-screen
condition.
Infants also looked longer at two objects in the continuous-

screen condition, but this effect was only marginally
significant.

Xu and Carey's conclusions were that the

infants interpreted the discontinuous -screen event as

involving two objects.

The infants used the spatiotemporal

information to establish the number of objects and to track
the objects over time.

The authors also conclude that most

of the infants assumed that only one object was involved in

the continuous-screen event, in accord with adults'

interpretations.

month-old infants

Finally, Xu and Carey conclude that 10'

ability to use spatiotemporal information

to establish the number of objects in an event is robust.
12

These studies are all based
on the assumption that
the
infants have object permanence
knowledge. The studies are
important here because the
present experiment also

investigates infants

•

knowledge of object permanence
and

nu,*er.

Specifically, the goal of the
present experiment is
to replicate the results of Xu
and Careys study, and to test

the hypothesis that the results
may be better explained by
lower-level perceptual processing
rather than by cognitive
processing such as reasoning.

13

CHAPTER II

THE EXPERIMENT AND ITS
PREDICTIONS

The present experiment was
designed with several goals
in mind.
The first goal was to replicate
the findings of Xu
and Carey (in press) with 10-month-old
infants, a second
goal was to determine whether the
same pattern of results
would be found with younger infants,
at 5.5 months of age.
The findings of Spelke and Kestenbaum
(as cited in Xu &
Carey, in press) suggested that differential
looking might be
found for the discontinuous-screen condition,
but not for the

continuous-screen condition.

However, since the full

habituation paradigm used by Spelke and Kestenbaum was not
used here, it was worth investigating whether

5

.

5-month-old

infants would perform as well as 10-month-old infants with a

fixed number of trials,

if the understanding is adult-like,

or even perhaps innate, there should be little difference

between 5.5- and 10-month-old infants.
replicate with

5.

Results which do not

5-month-old infants may suggest that, if

infants do have a robust understanding of number at 10 months
of age, it is an understanding that undergoes significant

development between 5.5 and

10

months of age.

Such results

would suggest that knowledge of object permanence and of
number is not innate, but develops rapidly in the first year

14

Of life, or else cannot
be measured at 5.5 months
in the same
way as at 10 months of age.

Another goal was investigated
by presenting infants with
a variation of the conditions
used by Spelke and Kestenbaum
(as cited in Xu & Carey, in
press) and by Xu and Carey (in
press).
It is possible that infants
may look

longer at
"unexpected" outcomes for reasons
other than that they have
inferred the correct number of objects.
One alternative and
more parsimonious interpretation is
that the results may be
due to lower-level perceptual
processing rather than to

higher-level cognitive functioning,

it may not be necessary

for infants to draw inferences about
objects and their

properties in order for them to look longer at
what an adult
would consider an unexpected outcome. Longer looking
times

may not reveal anything about inferences on the
part of the
infant.

The perceptual processing perspective maintains that

young infants do not have innate or acquired knowledge of
object permanence or of number, and that young infants do not
use higher-level cognitive processes such as inferring or

reasoning about the properties of objects.

The assumption is

that the young infant has no representation of an object

while it is occluded, since the infant cannot see and has not
seen the object while it is occluded, and does not yet have
the ability to infer the object's possible location.

Consider the discontinuous-screen condition used by
Spelke and Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu
15

&

Carey, in press) and

by xu and Carey (in press),
with this interpretation
in mind.
The discontinuous condition
involves attending back and
forth
to two separate bundles of
activity,
it is possible that the
infant's representation of this
event does not include the
information that there is a space
between the screens through
which Objects could travel, since
during the actual
familiarization trials the infant's
attention is not

attracted to the center of the stage,

it is also possible

that the motor behavior of turning
the head and looking back
and forth is establishing a sense
of "twoness", such that the
presentation of one object in the test
trials is contrasting
enough to hold the infant's attention
longer.
This

interpretation does not require the infant to
infer that it
is logically impossible for there to have
been only
one

object on the stage.

The same interpretation can be applied

to the findings for the continuous condition.

The smoother

visual tracking of the object in this condition can lead to a

perception of "oneness", such that the presentation of two
objects in the test trials is novel and more interesting,

without requiring expectation or knowledge of number.
Infants may also look longer at two objects in the continuous

condition because they do not expect to see an object in the
left location when they last saw an object on the right side
of the stage and vice versa.

The remaining two conditions of the present experiment

were designed with the perceptual processing perspective in
mind.

The apparatus was the same as for the first two
16

conditions, and the infants
were presented with continuous
and discontinuous conditions.
The only difference is that
the Objects did not start and
finish behind the screens, but
Off the stage. For each
familiarization trial, the objects
were occluded by being off the
stage.
They came in towards
the center of the stage and were
occluded temporarily by the
screens, and they exited again off
to the sides of the stage
(see Figures 3 and 4 on the following
pages). These two
conditions are referred to as the
continuous-periphery and
discontinuous -periphery conditions

Since no object ever ended up behind the
screens at the
end of a familiarization trial, no object
should be behind
the screens when they are removed. However,
when the screens

were removed, either one or two objects were revealed.
Adults would express surprise at either outcome,

infants

with object permanence knowledge should look longer on the
average in the periphery conditions, since the presence of

either one or two objects should be unexpected,

if infants

do have an understanding of object properties and of number,
it might be expected that the looking times to one and two

objects in the periphery conditions would not differ
significantly.

(The experiment included a test for a

baseline tendency to look differentially at one versus two
objects.)

If infants do not have a full understanding of

object properties and number, the same results could be
obtained as were obtained by Xu and Carey (in press).
Infants could look longer at one object in the discontinuous17

periphery condition and at
two objects in the continuousperiphery condition, because
of so»e lower-level,
perceptual
processing explanation or novelty
effect. Another
possibility is that the results
may indicate
that 10-.onth-

old infants have a fuller
understanding of objects than 5.5month-old infants. Such results
would lend support to the
hypothesis that knowledge of objects
and physical laws may
not be present at birth, but
develops rapidly early in life.

18

Object 1
emerges

Object 1
returns

Object 2
emerges

4.

Object
returns

5.

Either
outcome
imlikely

Figure

3.

2

Schematic representation of the discontinuous-

periphery condition.
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1.

Object
emerges;
crosses
stage 4
times

2.

Object
returns

3.

Either
outcome
unlikely

Figure

4.

Schematic representation of the continuous-

periphery condition.
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CHAPTER III

METHOD

Particip an-hg

Forty full-term infants participated
in the study.
Twenty infants (13 female, 7 male)
ranged in age from 5
months 5 days to 6 months 9 days, with
a mean

of 5 months 21

days, and 20 infants (13 female,

7

male) ranged in age from

9

months 24 days to 10 months 20 days, with
a mean of 10 months
Eight infants participated in a baseline
4 days.
condition,
and eight participated in each of the four
experimental

conditions,

in each condition, half of the infants were 5.5

months old and half were 10 months old.

Six additional

infants were excluded from the sample because of fussiness,

and one because of experimenter error.

Participants were

recruited from published birth announcements through a letter
and subsequent telephone call to parents.

Participants

received a toy and a certificate of appreciation for

participating

21

Materials

Four identical pink toy
pigs were used in the
familiarization and test trials.
The objects were about 8 x
7.5 X 6.5 cm in size. Yellow
posterboard was attached to two
masonite screens which were about
11.5 x 25.5 cm in size.

Apparatus

Testing took place in a brightly lit
experimental room
(300 X 225 cm).

A wooden stage (203 x 141 x 70 cm) was

located in the center of the room.

Two black curtains (180 x

95 cm) hung from the sides of the stage to the
wall behind

the infant in order to isolate the infant and
parent from the

rest of the experimental room.

A black cloth hung parallel

to the back of the stage, making the depth of the stage
39
cm.

A shorter black cloth divider (100 x 21 cm) hung between

the black cloth wall and the front of the stage, making the

portion of the stage floor visible to the infant 25 cm in
depth.

Infants viewed the events through an opening (37 x 63

cm) in the front of the stage.

All parts of the stage visible to the infant were

covered with black cloth in order to minimize distraction.

narrow groove (86.5 x

1

cm) running parallel to the back wall

of the stage was located in the floor of the stage.

additional grooves (19 x

A

1

Four

cm) ran perpendicular to the main
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groove, one behind each
screen and one at each
end of the
stage. The objects traveled
along these grooves.
The
Objects were attached to
wooden dowels (57 x 1 c.)
that were
operated from under the floor
of the stage by the

experimenter.

The screens were two
vertical masonite boards
(11.5 X 25.5 cm), covered with yellow
posterboard and
positioned 11 cm apart from each
other in the center of the
stage. The masonite boards
were glued at the top and
bottom
to horizontal black masonite
boards (36 x 11.5 cm) to
stabilize the movement of the two
screens as they were raised
and lowered by a pulley system
operated by the experimenter
from behind the stage.

Two video cameras were mounted in the
room in order to
record the infant's face and the events on
the stage. The
camera focusing on the infant's face was
positioned centered
behind the black cloth wall of the back of the
stage (36 cm

above the floor), so that only the lens was visible
to the
infant.

The camera focusing on the stage was positioned

above and behind the infant.

The video monitor for the

camera focusing on the infant's face was used by the observer
from a separate room.

Looking times were recorded online

using a keyboard interface to a Macintosh SE/30 computer
operated by the observer.
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Procediirp

For all five groups (four
experimental plus baseline),
the infant was seated in an
infant car seat secured to a
chair. The infant's face was
about 45 cm from the stage, and
eye level was about 18 cm above
the floor of the stage. The
parent was seated next to the infant,
but with his or her
back to the stage. The parent was
instructed not to look at
the displays, so as not to influence
the infant's behavior,
and not to interact with the infant
unless the infant became
too fussy to continue the experiment.

Experimental Groups

For each of the four experimental conditions, the

familiarization trials began with the stage empty.

The

experimenter drew the infant's attention to the empty stage
by tapping the stage with her hand until the infant looked.
The infant was briefly presented with the object both

stationary and moving across the stage.

The object was

removed from the stage, and the screens were lowered.

The

experimenter drew the infant's attention to the spaces
between and on either side of the screens by tapping her hand
until the infant looked.
The objects moved at a rate of about 10 cm/sec, so that
it took about

6

sec to travel the length of the stage once.

The objects were in continuous motion, as in Spelke and
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Kestenbaum-s experiment (as
cited in Xu
rather than being stationary

.

Carey, in press)

for part of the time,
as in xl

and Careys (in press) study.

For each of the four

conditions, half the infants
saw the object start moving
from
the left Side, and half saw
the object start moving
from the
right side. Each infant was
presented with four
familiarization trials, each followed
by a test trial, ivo
test trials revealed one object
behind the screens, and two
test trials revealed two objects.
The order of object
presentations was counterbalanced:
1,2,2,1; 2,1,1,2; 1,2,1,2;

2,1,2,1.

The side on which the single object
was also
counterbalanced between subjects. Each test
trial ended when
the infant looked away from the object(s)
for 2 consecutive
sec after having looked for at least .5
cumulative sec. The
stage was cleared of objects and screens after
each test

trial and before each subsequent familiarization
trial.

Continuous-screen Condition

For half the infants in the continuous-screen condition,

the object came out from behind the left screen, moved to the
left end of the stage, then to the right end of the stage,

and back to the left end of the stage.

The object traversed

the stage in this manner a total of four times, and its final

position was occluded by the left screen.

For the other half

of the infants, the object emerged from and returned to the

right screen.

The screens were raised to reveal one or two
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objects.

When only one object was
revealed, it was behind
the screen where it was last
seen.
For
half the infants,

this was on the left and for
half it was on the right.

Discont inuous-scr een Gondii- inn

For half the infants, the left
object moved first. The
object emerged from behind the left
screen, traveled to the
left end of the stage, and traveled back
to its position
behind the left screen. There was a pause
of about 3 sec

when no objects were visible (the time it would
take the
object to travel from the left edge of the left

screen to the

right edge of the right screen), followed by the emergence
of
the right object from the right screen.

This event was

repeated four times, and the last visual contact with an

object was as it was being occluded by the right screen.

When there was only one object displayed in the test trials,
it was on the right.

The other half of the infants first saw

the object emerge from the right screen and last saw the

object being occluded by the left screen.

When one object

was displayed in the test trials, it was on the left.

Continuous-periphery Condition

For half the infants, the object entered the stage from

the left, traveled across the stage to the right end of the
stage, and back to the left end.
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This event was repeated

four times.

Except for the beginning
and end of each
familiarization trial, in which
the object was occluded
because it was off the stage,
the object was only occluded
by
the screens. At the end of
the familiarization trial,
the
infant last saw the object
leaving the left side of the
stage, when only one object
was presented in the test
trials, it was on the left. The
other half of the infants
first saw the object enter from
the right and last saw it
exit on the right, when only one
object was presented in the
test trials, it was on the right.

Discontinuous -periphery Condition

For half the infants, the object entered the
stage from
the left, was occluded by the left screen, and
then exited to
the left side of the stage again. After a 3-sec
pause, an

object entered the stage on the right, was occluded by the
right screen, and exited the stage to the right.
was repeated four times,

This event

since the object was last seen on

the right side of the stage, the presentation of one object
in the test trials was on the right.

For the other half of

the infants, the object was first seen on the right and last
on the left.

When one object was presented in the test

trial, it was on the left.
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Baseline Group

Eight infants (four 5.5and four lO-month-old infants)
were presented with four
baseline trials to determine
whether
they had an initial preference
for looking at either
one or

two objects.

All baseline trials began
with the stage empty.
The experimenter drew the
infant's attention to the empty
stage by tapping the stage with
her hand until the infant
looked. The infant was briefly
presented with the moving
object on the stage. The object
was removed from the stage,
and the screens were lowered.
The experimenter drew the
infant's attention to the spaces
between and on either side
of the screens by tapping her hand
until the infant looked.
The screens were then raised to reveal
the object(s).

Two trials revealed one object and two
trials revealed two
objects. The order of object presentations
was

counterbalanced as in the experimental group.

The side of

the presentation of the single object (left or
right) was

also counterbalanced.

Baseline trials were ended using the

same criteria for trials in the experimental group.

stage was cleared of screens and objects between each

baseline trial.
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The

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The first observer (RSB) used a video monitor
to score

looking times during the experiment.

The scores of the first

observer were used in the data analyses.

Since the first and

second observers have previously achieved reliability

measures above .98 (see Bogartz, Shinskey

only

6

&

Speaker, 1995),

of the 40 subjects were rescored by the second

observer (JLS).

Interobserver reliability was .977.

Baseline Group

An analysis of variance conducted on the data from the
baseline group included four factors with two levels each.
The variables were age (5.5 or 10 months), number of objects
(one or two), sequence of objects (1,2,2,1; 2,1,1,2; 1,2,1,2;

2,1,2,1), and trial (first or second pair of object

presentations).

No main effects or interactions were found.

Infants did not show a significant preference for looking at

two objects over one object.
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Experimental Crnnpo

For the experimental
groups, the variables
included in
the analysis of variance
were age (5.5 or 10
months),
movement (continuous or
discontinuous), location of
occlusion
(screen or periphery), side
of single object (left
or right)
number of objects (one or two),
sequence of objects
(1,2,2,1;
2,1,1,2; 1,2,1,2; 2,1,2,1), and trial
pair (first or second
pair Of Object presentations).
Sequence of objects was
completely confounded with the
Movement x Location x Side
interaction. The mean looking
times for the
'

four

experimental groups are listed in
Table

1

at the end of the

chapter and the analysis of variance
is listed in Table
Since the first analysis indicated

2.

that the sequence factor

was not involved in any significant
effects, the subsequent
analyses excluded sequence as a factor
in order to increase

power

The Cognitive Processing Hypothesis

Test Trials

The specific predictions and outcomes of the cognitive

processing hypothesis were as follows.

First, we expected to

replicate the results of Xu and Carey's two original
conditions,

if infants have object permanence knowledge that

can be manifested in this task, they should look longer at
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two Objects in the
continuous-screen condition and
one obj ect
in the discontinuous-screen
condition. This looking pattern
would have been reflected
in a significant Movement
x
Location X Number interaction
effect.
However, no such

effect was found.
Second, according to the
cognitive processing
hypothesis, infants should generally
look longer during test
trials of periphery events than
screen events, since both
periphery outcomes are unlikely, whereas
only one screen

outcome is unlikely.

This pattern would be revealed by
a

significant main effect of location of
occlusion.
no main effect of location was found.

However,

Third, if 10-month-old infants have more
object

permanence knowledge than

5

.

5-month-old infants, it is

possible that only the older infants would look
longer at

periphery test trials than screen test trials.

This pattern

would be manifested by a significant Age x Location
interaction.

No Age x Location interaction occurred;

however, a marginally significant Age x Location x Trial

interaction occurred [F(l,16) = 4.207, p < .057], as may be
seen in Figure

5 at

the end of the chapter.

Ten-month-old

infants did look longer following the periphery events than
the screen events on the first trial pair, although they

looked about equally on the second trial pair.

Five-and-a-

half-month-old infants looked about equally to the periphery
and screen events on both trial pairs, although they looked

longer at the first trial pair than at the second trial pair
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The fourth prediction of
the cognitive processing
hypothesis was that infants
would look equally at one and
two
Objects in the periphery
conditions. This pattern would
have
been reflected in a significant
Movement x Location x Number
interaction, but no interaction
occurred.

A fifth, related prediction was
that 10-month-old
infants would look equally at
one and two objects, although
5.5-month-old infants may not.
this case, a significant
Age X Movement x Location x Number
interaction would occur.
An Age x Movement x Location x Number
interaction did occur
[F(l,16) = 6.054, p < .026]; however,
it does not support the
pattern that was expected, as seen in
Figure 6 at the end of
the chapter. Ten-month-old infants looked
longer at test
trials following continuous events than
discontinuous events,

m

and they looked longer at two objects than one,
regardless of
the location of occlusion (screen or periphery events).
However, 5.5-month-old infants looked about equally at one

and two objects in the discontinuous-screen condition, looked
longer at two objects in the continuous-screen and

discontinuous -periphery conditions, and looked longer at one
object in the continuous -periphery condition.
The only pattern predicted by the cognitive processing

hypothesis that was partially, but not significantly,

revealed was for 5.5-month-old infants for the screen

condition on the first trial pair only, as shown in the Age x

Movement x Location x Trial x Number interaction (Figure 7).
However, the pattern is reversed on the second trial pair for
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these infants.

Furthermore, the pattern of
looking for the
5.5-month-old infants in the
periphery events, as well as
the
pattern for 10-.onth-old
infants in both screen and
periphery
events, does not conform to
cognitive processing predictions.

Familiarization Trials

The sixth prediction involves
looking time during
familiarization trials. Both the
continuous -screen and
discontinuous-screen events are actually
impossible events,
infants saw the screens being lowered
onto an empty stage,
and immediately following, an object
emerged from behind a
screen, since no object was on the
stage before the screens
were lowered, this was an impossible event,
if infants have
object permanence knowledge, the impossible
screen events

should violate their expectations.

Infants with object

permanence knowledge should therefore look longer at the
screen events than at the periphery events during the

familiarization trials.

An analysis of variance showed a

main effect of location of occlusion.

However, the effect

reflected a pattern in the opposite direction: infants
actually looked longer during familiarization to the

periphery events than to the screen events [F(l,16) = 23.386,
p < .000].

One problem with this analysis is that the

periphery events took longer for the experimenter to enact
than the screen events, so that infants had more time to
look.

However, infants in the screen events were found to
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spend about 76% of the
ti.e looking, whereas
infants in the
periphery events spent about
84%
of the time looking.

The Perceptual Processing
Hypothes IS

Test Trial

The perceptual processing
hypothesis shared the same
first prediction as the cognitive
processing hypothesis - to
replicate the results of the two
original conditions of Xu
and Carey. However, as discussed
above, replication did not
occur. No significant Movement x
Location x Number

interaction occurred.
The second prediction was that infants
would look
equally at screen and periphery events, since
infants are not
assumed to know that any object in periphery
events is

unlikely.

This prediction was confirmed: no main effect of

location of occlusion occurred.
The third prediction was that infants in the continuous

conditions should look longer at two objects, and infants in
the discontinuous conditions should look longer at one
object, as would be reflected by a Movement x Number

interaction.

No Movement x Number interaction was found.

However, a Movement x Side x Number interaction was found
[F(l,16) = 4.808, p < .043], as seen in Figure
of the chapter,

8

at the end

when the single object was shown on the

right side, infants looked longer at two objects following
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the continuous events.

However, when the single
object was
Shown on the left side,
infants looXed longer
at two objects
following the discontinuous
events. The meaning of
this
interaction is unclear
i.,4unciear, anrf
and interactions
involving the side
factor are discussed later
in the paper.

Fourth, it was possible
that 10-month-old infants
might
look longer at two objects
in the continuous-screen
condition
and one object in the
discontinuous-screen condition, but
look equally at one and two
objects in the two periphery
conditions, if they have object
permanence knowledge. This
prediction, mentioned in a previous
section, would have been
reflected in an Age x Movement x
Location x Number
interaction with a specific looking
pattern. Although an

interaction occurred, the predicted
looking pattern was not
reflected in it.

Familiarization Trials

The fifth prediction for the perceptual processing

hypothesis involved looking time on familiarization
trials.
Infants without object permanence knowledge would not be

expected to look any longer at screen events during
familiarization than at periphery events, since they are not

expected to realize that the screen familiarization events
are actually impossible.

This prediction was confirmed,

since the main effect of location of occlusion for

familiarization trials did not show infants to look longer at
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screen events than
periphery events. As
mentioned earlier
infants actually looked
significantly longer at periphery
events [F(1,16) = 23.386,

'

p < .OOO].

ynpredicted Sionifin^n^- p^^^i^^

Test Trials

Many significant results occurred
that were not
predicted, since the pattern of

these results cannot be

determined by looking at the analysis
of variance in Table
they are briefly described here.

2,

infants looked longer on the first
pair of test trials
than on the second pair of test trials,
as shown by the main
effect of trial [F(l, 16) = 35.047,
p < .000]
infants also
looked longer at two objects than at one object
[main effect
.

of number: F(l,16) = 6.105, p < .025].

This was not

expected, given the finding that the baseline group
did not

have a significant preference for two objects over one.

in

addition, 5.5-month-old infants looked longer at test trials

following discontinuous than continuous events, whereas 10-

month-old infants showed the reverse pattern [Age x Movement
interaction: F(l, 16) = 7.171, p < .016)

]

.

A marginally

significant Age x Movement x Trial interaction [F(l,16) =
4.121, p < .059] supported the same pattern for the first

trial pair.

Finally, infants looked longer at test trials
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following the discontinuous
than continuous events on the
first pair of object
presentations, but looked longer
following continuous than
discontinuous events on the second
pair of object presentations
[Movement x Trial interaction:
F(l,16) = 7.984, p < .012].
In addition, many unexpected
interactions involving the

side factor were found.

The side factor indicates whether

the infant saw the single object in
the left or right
location.
Five-and-a-half -month-old infants looked
longer on
test trials following the screen events
when the single
object was shown on the right side, but
looked longer

following the periphery events when the single
object was
shown on the left side. Ten-month-old infants,
however,

looked longer following the screen events when the
single

object was shown on the right, and looked longer following
the periphery events when the single object was shown on the
left [marginally significant Age x Location x Side

interaction: F(l,16) = 4.039, p < .062].

In addition,

five-

and-a-half -month-old infants in the screen events and 10-

month-old infants in the periphery events looked longer at
the first trial pair when the single object was shown on the
left, but did not prefer left or right on the second trial

pair.

However,

5

.

5-month-old infants in the periphery events

and 10-month-old infants in the screen events looked longer
at the first trial pair when the single object was shown on

the right, but did not show a preference on the second trial

pair [Age x Location x Side x Trial interaction: F(l,16) =
37

8.942, p < .009].

in addition, the Age
x Side x Number
interaction [F(1,16) = 4.8O8,
p < .043] was significant: 5.5-

month-old infants looked longer
at one object when it was
on
the right, and longer at two
objects when the single object
was on the left. Ten-month-old
infants, however, looked

longer at both one and two objects
when the single object was
on the right, and generally looked
longer at two objects than
one.
Finally, the Age x Movement x Side
x Number interaction
[F(l,16) = 6.054, p < .026] was also
significant: both 5.5and 10-month-old infants looked longer
at two objects than
one when the single object was shown
on the right following
the continuous conditions. However,
5.5-month-old
infants in

the discontinuous conditions looked longer
at one object than
two when the single object was on the right,
and looked

longer at two objects than one when the single object
was on
the left.

Ten-month-old infants in the discontinuous

conditions looked longer at both one and two objects when the
single object was shown on the left than when it was shown on
the right.

Familiarization Trials

Several unpredicted findings also occurred in the

familiarization trial analysis.

Ten-month-old infants spent

more time looking away when the object started from the
right, but 5.5-month-old infants looked away more when the

object started from the left [Age x Side interaction: F(l,16)
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= 6.241, p < .024].

in addition, infants
looked longer when

the single object started
moving from the left side
in the
periphery event, whereas in
the screen event, they
looked
longer when it started moving
from the right side [marginally
significant Location x Side
interaction: F(1,16) = 4.049,
p <

Similarly, infants looked
about equally during the
continuous-screen and continuous
-periphery conditions whether
the single object started from
the left or the right, but
looked longer in the discontinuous
-periphery condition when
the object started from the left,
and looked longer in the
discontinuous-screen condition when the
object started from
the right [Movement x Location x
Side interaction: F(l,16) =
12.382, p < .003].
.061].

Additional Analy ses

All of the analyses above were performed on infants'
total looking time for each trial, as well as on both the
first and second trial pairs.

Additional analyses were

performed on the infants' first look during each trial, as
well as for the first trial pair only.

Fewer significant

results were found overall when only the first look and/or
first trial pair were analyzed.

When total looking time was analyzed for the first trial
pair only, the results revealed the same looking patterns as

when both trial pairs were analyzed.
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However, significance

level increased or
decreased for so^e of these
results, ror
example, the marginally
significant Age x Location
x side
interaction ,p < .062, became
significant when only the first
trial pair was analyzed
[F(1,16) = 7.310,
p < .oi6].

However, the effect of nu^l^r
(longer looking at two obj,
iects
than one, with a
p < .025, was no longer significant
when
only the first trial pair was
analyzed [F,l,16) = 2.664,
<
p

.122],

When only the infants' first
looking time (first gaze)
on each trial was analyzed for
both trial

pairs, some of the

significant results mirrored those
found for total looking
time, but some new results occurred.
Three

of these effects,

one of which was marginally significant,
involved the side
factor. Since interpretation of the
meaning of the results
involving the side factor is unclear, they
will not be

discussed further.

The fourth, marginally significant effect

(Location X Trial x Number [F(l,16) = 3.992,
p < .063])

supoorted the finding that infants looked longer at two
objects than one for both trial pairs of the periphery
events, but in the screen events, infants looked longer at

two objects on the first trial pair and one object on the
second trial pair.

This finding does not support either of

the hypotheses investigated here.
Infants

'

first looking times were also analyzed for the

first trial pair only.
overall.

Fewer significant results were found

One result mirrored the previous pattern of the Age

X Movement interaction.

The second significant finding was a
40

new result, but involved
the
uue side
siae
meaningfully interpreted here.
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Table

1

Mean looking

tixnes to one and two
objects as a

function of

age, movement, location
and side

Trial

Group

No

1

1

No

Trial
2

No

1

2

No

2

5.5 month olds (n = 16)

Continuous -per iphery
L

13.950

8.400

6.700

4.817

R

4.633

4.608

9.833

8.158

L

8.650

4.558

4.267

3.225

R

3.833

29.958

10.892

3.933

L

8.967

43.200

6.583

9.908

R

21.692

20.308

9.317

5.175

L

9.308

28.808

5.000

7.817

R

41.092

10.200

3.825

9.383

Continuous-screen

Discontinuous -periphery

Discontinuous -screen

Continued, next page
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Table

1

continued

10 month olds

(n = 16)

Continuous periphery
L

9.542

15.083

10.425

12.892

R

24.508

31.217

5.425

17.808

L

18.542

14.283

14.500

14.958

R

10.600

10.650

5.808

15.775

L

8.100

13.967

5.717

9.433

R

27.242

23.425

7.625

7.992

L

8.375

9.925

3.125

6.508

R

6.375

14.100

4.600

13.325

Continuous-screen

Discontinuous-periphery

Discontinuous -screen

Note.

Looking times are in sec.
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Table

2

Analysis of variance of looking
times

Source

df

MS

F

Between subjects

Age

(A)

^

29.471

0.230

i

71.950

0.556

i

114.194

0.882

i

170.124

1.314

2

928.266

**7.171

I

103.141

0.797

I

25.235

0.195

I

34.688

0.268

I

2.042

0.016

L X S

I

2.411

0.019

A X M X L

1

0.203

A X M X S

1

71.551

0.553

A X L X S

1

522.857

*4.039

M X L X S

1

16.603

0.128

AxMxLxS

1

51.723

0.400

16

129.438

Movement

(M)

Location of occlusion

(L)

Side of single object (S)

A X M
A X L
A X S
M X L
M X S

S within-group error
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Table

2

continued

Within subjects

Trial pair

(T)

1850.601

****35.047

125.281

2.373

421.588

**7.984

46.843

0.887

71.351

1.351

217.622

*4.121

222.166

*4.207

81.973

1.552

15.657

0.297

.940

0.018

7.363

0.139

T X A X M X L

15.703

0.297

T X A X M X S

8.422

0.159

T X A X L X S

472.141

***8.942

T X M X L X S

3.955

0.075

TxAxMxLxS

4.896

0.093

T X A
T X M
T X L
T X S
T X A X M

T X A X L
T X A X S
T X M X L

T X M X S
T X L X S

T X S within-group error

16
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52.803

Table

2

continued

Number of objects

(N)

280.549

**6.105

22.641

0.493

10.484

0.228

9.589

0.209

43.517

0.947

27.969

0.609

1.221

0.027

220.938

**4.808

15.240

0.332

676.967

****14.732

53.260

1.159

N X A X M X L

278.185

**6.054

N X A X M X S

278.185

**6.054

N X A X L X S

5.514

0.120

N X M X L X S

0.054

0.001

63.141

1.374

N X A
N X M
N X L

N X S
N X A X M
N X A X L
N X A X S
N X M X L

N X M X S
N X L X S

NxAxMxLxS
N X S within-group error

16
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45.941

laDle

2

continued

T X N
12.272

0.236

128.067

2.461

0.096

0.002

36.587

0.703

109.829

2.111

21.918

0.421

2.284

0.044

12.984

0.250

T X N X M X L

172.283

3.311

T X N X M X S

408.146

**7.845

T X N X L X S

8.559

0.165

292.316

**5.618

T X N X A
T X N X M
T X N X L
T X N X S
T X N X A X M
T X N X A X L
T X N X A X S

T Y M A A X M X

Jj

T X N X A X M X S

537 .783

XU

.

OJo

T X N X A X L X S

0 745

T X N X M X L X S

85.097

1.636

110.323

2.120

T X N X A X M X L X S

T X N X S within-group

16

52.028

error
Note.

Looking times are in sec.

**E < 0.05.

< 0.01.

S = subjects.

< .001.
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*g_

< 0.10.
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CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Although recent evidence has
been interpreted as
revealing cognitive processing

of occluded objects by young

infants, we believe a more
parsimonious view involving
perceptual processing may account for
some results. The
present experiment was designed to
differentiate between the
cognitive processing and perceptual
processing hypotheses
concerning infants' representations of the
number of objects
involved in an occlusion event.
Xu and Carey concluded that the 10-month-old
infants in

their study used spatiotemporal information to
infer the
number of objects involved in the events.

After being

familiarized with a discontinuous-screen event involving two
objects, infants looked longer at test trials that revealed

only one object.

After familiarization with a continuous-

screen event involving only one object, most infants looked
longer at two objects during test trials.

Xu and Carey

concluded that 10-month-old infants know that an object
cannot exist in two places without existing in the

intervening space and time, and they use this information to
infer that there are two objects in the discontinuous-screen
event.

Similarly, most of the infants represent the smooth,
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continuous path
F«n of
oi tho
the t-m,
toy

m

inlying that only one object

the continuous-screen event
as
is present.

we believe that a sUnpler
explanation may account for
these results. The perceptual
processing perspective
proposes that the presentation
of two
discrete bundles of

activity during

f amliarization

with the discontinuous-screen

event contrasts perceptually
with the presentation of one
Object on test trials and captures
the

infant's attention.

Simlarly, the smoother tracking in
familiarization with the
continuous -screen event contrasts with
the back-and-forth
looking at two objects on test trials

and causes the infant

to look longer.
we attempted to replicate Xu and Carey's
results, and to
test the perceptual processing perspective
by presenting

infants with two additional periphery events.

The periphery

events were perceptually similar to the two original
screen
conditions.

There were two bundles of activity at either end

of the stage in both the discontinuous-screen and

discontinuous-periphery events.

In the continuous -screen and

continuous -periphery events, one object traveled in a smooth

path across the stage and back.

However, in the periphery

events, no objects were left behind the screens at the end of

familiarization, and therefore no objects should have been

revealed when the screens were raised.

Infants who have

object permanence knowledge and who can use spatiotemporal
information to infer number should look equally long at one
and two objects, since both outcomes are unexpected.
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They

Should also loo. longer
in the periphery
conditions than in
the screen conditions,
since the presence o, any
objects is
unexpected.
we tested 10-month-old
infants in order to
replicate the
original study, we tested 5
.5-.onth-old infants because we
are not convinced that infants
of this age have attained
the
object concept, although we
would not be surprised if 10month-old infants have. Much of
the recent evidence on
physical knowledge in infancy is
interpreted as showing that
infants as young as 3 or 4 months
of age have object
permanence knowledge. Although the
5.5-month-old infants may
not show the same looking patterns
as the 10-month-old
infants (using spatiotemporal information
to infer number),
they should look longer at test trials
in the periphery
events than in the screen events if they
have object

permanence knowledge.

The Cog nitive Processing Hypothesis

The specific predictions of the cognitive processing

hypothesis were as follows.

1)

The original findings would

be replicated: infants would look longer at one object in the

discontinuous-screen condition and two objects in the

continuous-screen condition.

2)

Infants would generally look

longer in the periphery conditions than in the screen
conditions.

3)

Ten-month-old infants, but not 5.5-month-old
54

infants

^gnt

loo. longer in periphery
than screen conditions
If they have more object
permanence knowledge than
the
younger infants.
4, infants would look
equally long at one
and two Objects in the
periphery conditions, since
both
outcomes are impossible.
5) Ten-month-old but not
5.5-monthold infants may look equally
at one and two objects
in the
periphery conditions for the
san. reason given above.
6, On
familiarization trials, infants,
especially lO-month-old
infants, would look longer at
screen events than periphery
events, since the screen condition
actually involves an
impossible event.

The cognitive processing hypothesis
was not supported by
the results of this study. First,
Xu and Carey's results
were not replicated, and this calls
into question the
robustness of their findings. This finding
is additionally
important because Xu & Carey's Experiment
1 was the

foundation for the remaining experiments
discussed in their
paper,
if the results of Experiment 1 cannot

be replicated,

the experiments which followed may be questioned.

One

qualification that must be added, however, is that our
procedure was not identical to Xu and Carey's.

Xu and Carey

allowed the objects to remain stationary for part of the time

during familiarization,

in order to accommodate the 5.5-

month-old infants in our study, we kept the objects in motion
throughout familiarization,

it is possible that the novelty

of seeing stationary objects for the first time during test
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trials may have changed
the looking pattern that
infants
would otherwise have shown.
in terms of the
replication prediction, then,
infants,
even 10-.onth-olds, did
not looK longer at one
object in the

discontinuous-screen condition and
two objects in the
continuous-screen condition. Second,

infants did not look

longer in the periphery conditions
than in the screen
conditions. Five-and-a-half
-month-old infants actually
looked longer in the screen
conditions than in the periphery
conditions. Regarding the third
prediction,
however, a

marginal effect supported the finding
that 10-month-old
infants on the first trial pair only

looked longer in the

periphery conditions than in the screen
conditions (Figure
This effect disappeared in the second
5).
trial
pair,

however

Regarding the fourth prediction, infants did
not look
equally long at one and two objects in the periphery

events.

Five-and-a-half-month-old infants looked longer at two
objects in the discontinuous-periphery condition and
slightly

longer at one object in the continuous-periphery condition
(Figure 6).

Ten-month-old infants looked slightly longer at

two objects in both periphery events, so the fifth prediction

regarding the 10-month-inf ants was not confirmed either.
The only looking pattern, although not significant, that

seemed to conform to the predictions of the cognitive

processing hypothesis was that of the

5

.5-month-old infants

in the original continuous-screen and discontinuous-screen
56

conditions for the firctfirst ^-rA^^
trial pair only (Figure
7).
this
case, the 5.5-month-old
infants did look longer at one
Object in the discontinuous-screen
condition and two objects
in the continuous-screen
condition. However, that pattern
reversed itself in the second
test trial pair, and was not
exhibited by 10-month-old infants,
addition,

m

m

the 5.5-

month-old infants did not look
equally at one and two objects
in the periphery conditions, as
would be predicted by the
cognitive processing hypothesis.
One last prediction of the
cognitive processing
hypothesis involved looking times on
familiarization trials
rather than test trials. The screen
events are actually
impossible because the infants see the screens
being lowered
onto an empty stage and then immediately
see an object emerge
from behind one of the screens. The cognitive
processing

hypothesis would predict that infants with object
permanence

knowledge would generally spend more time looking at the
screen events than the periphery events during
familiarization.

This was not the case, however. Infants

actually looked longer during familiarization to the

periphery events than to the screen events.
Although we were somewhat surprised that we did not
replicate Xu and Carey's original findings, the fact that the
predictions of the cognitive processing hypothesis were not
fulfilled in this study further corroborates our doubts about
claims that young infants mentally represent hidden objects
and can use spatiotemporal information to infer number.
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Failure to support the cognitive
processing hypothesis in
this study lends credence to the
hypothesis that results like
these may be better explained by an
alternative view; we
expect, the perceptual processing
hypothesis. However,
failure to replicate the original results
complicates any
arguments for the perceptual processing view.
The periphery
events were designed specifically around
the original events,
and our predictions about the periphery
results were based on
the assumption of replication. The predictions
of the

perceptual processing hypothesis for this study were not
fulfilled.

We were not able to clearly differentiate the

cognitive and perceptual processing hypotheses in this study.

The Perceptual Processing Hvpothesis

The specific predictions of the perceptual processing

hypothesis for this study were as follows.

1)

We predicted

replication of the results in the two original conditions,
but for perceptual rather than cognitive reasons
Infants, especially

5

.

.

2

5-month-old infants were expected to

look equally at the screen and periphery events, since it is
not assumed that they have object permanence knowledge.
However, we would not have been surprised if 10-month-old

infants exhibited object permanence knowledge by looking

longer in the periphery conditions than the screen
conditions.

4)

Infants were expected to show the same
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3)

looking pattern at one and
two objects in the periphery
conditions as in the screen
conditions: infants should look
longer at two objects in the
continuous periphery condition
and longer at one object in
the discontinuous-periphery
condition, for perceptual reasons.

5)

if lO-month-old

infants have greater object
permanence knowledge than 5.5month-old infants, they may look
equally at one and two
objects in the periphery conditions,
rather than showing the
above pattern. 6) infants were
expected not to look longer
during familiarization with the screen
events than the
periphery events.
The first prediction was not fulfilled,

results were not replicated.
was confirmed.

xu and Carey's

The second prediction, however,

Infants of both ages looked equally at the

screen and periphery events.

However, the third prediction

was marginally disconf irmed.

A marginal effect supported the

finding that 10-month-old infants looked longer in the

periphery than in the screen condition.
The fourth and fifth predictions were not fulfilled.
Infants, even 10-month-old infants, did not look longer at

two objects in the continuous-periphery condition and one

object in the discontinuous -periphery condition.

However,

infants did not even show that looking pattern for the

original conditions, which clouds our interpretation.

We

would have been harder pressed to explain this result if the
original results had been replicated.
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However, our other

results are not strongly indicative
of object permanence
knowledge, even among the
10-month-old infants.
The sixth prediction was confirmed,

infants with object

permanence knowledge should have
looked longer during
familiarization with the screen events
than the periphery
events, but they did not.

Unpredict ed Significant Results

Several significant results occurred which were not
predicted.

An Age x Movement interaction indicated that 10-

month-old infants on average spent more time looking at test
trials following the continuous events than those following
the discontinuous events, whereas 5.5-month-old infants

showed the reverse pattern.

We might have expected that the

discontinuous events might in general be intrinsically more
interesting and generate greater attention across
familiarization and test trials, since there are two separate
bundles of activity at which to look back and forth.
However, this only explains the 5.5-month-old infants'

pattern and not that of the 10-month-old infants.
All of the significant interactions involving the side

factor were unexpected.

The side factor was added only to

counterbalance the side on which the single object was shown.
In addition, the single object on the test trials was always

shown on the same side on which it was last seen during
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familiarization, so it cannot be that the infant
expected to
see the object on the other side. Our initial
speculation

was that the effect involving the side factor had
to do with

the mother's presence on the infant's right side.

We would

not have been surprised if the infant looked away more often

while an object was on the right side of the stage, since the
infant looked more at the mother when his or her head was

oriented to the right.

However, the distance between the

right and left object was only about 15 cm, and the pattern
of results does not conform to the pattern this explanation

would predict.

Infants sometimes spent more time looking

away during test trials on which the single object was on the
left, rather than on the right.

For example, see the

Movement x Side x Number interaction in Figure

8.

Infants

looked longer at two objects than one in the discontinuous
events only when the single object was presented on the left.
However, they looked longer at two than one in the

continuous -events only when the single object was on the
right

We were surprised that the side factor had any effect at
all, much less an effect so great that p < .001 in the case

of the Movement x Side x Number interaction in Figure

8.

We

do not know how to interpret the many interactions involving
the side factor.

In some cases, the results seemed to

support one hypothesis or the other, but only when the object
was on a particular side.

For example, in the marginally

significant Age x Location x Side interaction, 10-month-old
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infants looked longer following
the periphery events, as
predicted by the cognitive
processing hypothesis, but only
when the single object was on
the left,
since the side
factor is not a psychologically
meaningful one, we cannot
interpret any of the results in
which it is involved as
supporting either hypothesis.

Conclusions

Our general conclusions, then, are as follows.

The

findings of Xu and Carey were not robust enough
to be

replicated in this study.

The predictions of the cognitive

processing hypothesis were not fulfilled in this study,

we

are not convinced that infants can and do use spatiotemporal

information to infer number, nor are we convinced that
infants exhibit object permanence knowledge in this task.

The perceptual processing hypothesis fared somewhat

better than the cognitive processing hypothesis in that some
of its predictions were fulfilled.

Infants did not indicate

that their expectations were violated when objects in the

periphery events were revealed where none should have been.
Furthermore, infants did not look longer during

familiarization when an object emerged from behind a screen,

where no objects were before the screens were lowered.
However, the main prediction that infants would look longer
at two objects in the continuous -periphery condition and one

object in the discontinuous-periphery condition was not
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fulfilled,

we do not believe the
perceptual processing
hypothesis has failed, however,
since the original results
were not replicated. We generally
conclude that lack of
replication has made the results of
this study particularly
difficult to interpret, and that this
specific experimental
design was not well-suited for clearly
discriminating the
cognitive and perceptual processing
hypotheses with regard to
infants' representations of occlusion
events.

we are applying a new design in our lab
called the Event
Set X Event Set design (see Bogartz et al.,
1995), which has
already supported the perceptual processing
hypothesis in one
experiment, and which we are currently using in two

additional experiments.

Many studies of infants'

representations use the two-test design, in which infants are

habituated to an event and are then tested on a possible
event and an impossible event.

Since the perceptual

processing view suggests that infants' looking time on these
possible and impossible events may be due to other factors,

particularly the perceptual differences between habituation
and test events, the Event Set x Event Set paradigm was

designed to determine what these other factors might be.

In

this design, three groups of infants are habituated to the

three original events (habituation, possible and impossible),
and then each infant is tested on all three events.
Furthermore, the multiple regression analysis used with this

design is better able to pick out the specific elements of
the events that influence infants' looking time.
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It is more

specific than an analysis of
variance.
the results obtained with this

„e are hopeful that

design will support our belief

that many previous results iiaplying
cognitive processing of
occluded objects in young infants
can be explained by
invoking lower-level perceptual
processing.
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